A 48th Tactical Fighter Wing F-111F aircraft retracts its landing gear as it takes off to participate in a retaliatory air strike on Libya.
The United States Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine Corps carried out air strikes, code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon, against Libya on 15th April 1986 in retaliation for the West Berlin discotheque bombing ten days earlier, which U.S. president Ronald Reagan blamed on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. There were 40 reported Libyan casualties; one U.S. plane was shot down. One of the claimed Libyan deaths was of a baby girl, reported to be Gaddafi’s daughter, Hana Gaddafi. However, there are doubts both as to whether she was really killed, or even if she truly existed.
The targets were two alleged Libyan command and control centres for overseas operations, one training camp, and Benina and Mitiga International Airports. The strikes primarily used F-111 Aardvark fighter-bombers, launched from RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, and A-6E Intruder attack aircraft launched from the USS America (CV-66) and USS Coral Sea (CV-43) in the Gulf of Sidra. These were supported by electronic-warfare EF-111 Advarks and EA-6B Prowlers and anti-radar missile-carrying F/A-18 Hornets and A-7E Corsairs. Political disagreements led France, Spain, and Italy to deny the use of their United States Air Forces in Europe bases, and deny overflight permits.
Two USAF captains were killed when their F-111 was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra, possibly by a Libyan S-200 missile. Libya released the body of one pilot in 1989, and denied holding the body of the other pilot, while the pilot’s family alleged they had.
Origins
Libya represented a high priority for President Ronald Reagan shortly after his 1981 inauguration. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was firmly anti-Israel and had supported terrorist organizations in the Palestinian territories and Syria. There were reports that Libya was attempting to become a nuclear power and Gaddafi’s occupation of Chad, which was rich in uranium, was of major concern to the United States. Gaddafi’s ambitions to set up a federation of Arab and Muslim states in North Africa were alarming to U.S. interests. Furthermore, then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig wanted to take proactive measures against Gaddafi because he had been using former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives (most notably Edwin P. Wilson and Frank E. Terpil) to help set up terrorist camps.
After the December 1985 Rome and Vienna airport attacks, which killed 19 and wounded approximately 140, Gaddafi indicated that he would continue to support the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades, and the Irish Republican Army as long as the European governments allegedly “supported anti-Gaddafi Libyans.”
After years of occasional skirmishes with Libya over Libyan territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra, the United States contemplated a military attack to strike targets within the Libyan mainland. In March 1986, the United States, asserting the 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) limit to territorial waters according to international law, sent a carrier task force to the region. Libya responded with aggressive counter-maneuvers on 24 March that led to a naval engagement in the Gulf of Sidra.
On 5th April 1986, Libyan agents bombed “La Belle” nightclub in West Berlin, killing three people, including two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman, and injuring 229 people, including 79 Americans. West Germany and the United States obtained cable transcripts from Libyan agents in East Germany who were involved in the attack.
More detailed information was retrieved years later when Stasi archives were investigated by the reunited Germany. Libyan agents who had carried out the operation from the Libyan embassy in East Germany were identified and prosecuted by Germany in the 1990s.
Preparations
President of the United States Ronald Reagan in a briefing with US National Security Council staff on Operation El Dorado Canyon.
The attack mission against Libya had been preceded in October 1985 by an exercise in which the 20th TFW stationed at RAF Upper Heyford airbase in the UK, which was equipped with F-111E Aardvarks, received a top-secret order to launch a simulated attack mission on 18th October, with ten F-111Es armed with eight 500-lb practice bombs, against a simulated airfield located in Labrador, Canada south of CFB Goose Bay. The mission was designated Operation Ghost Rider. The mission was a full rehearsal for a long-range strike against Libya. The mission was completed successfully, with the exception of one aircraft that had all but one of its eight bombs hang up on one of its wing racks. The lessons learned were passed on to the 48th TFW which was equipped with the newer F-111F model.
4/15/1986 President Reagan being briefed by the National Security Council staff on the Libya air strike in the White House Situation Room (left to right) President Reagan George Shultz William Casey Don Regan General Charles Gabriel
In August 1985 six specially trained B-52H crews of the 23rd Bombardment Squadron in Minot, North Dakota, were designated as the Advanced Conventional Taskforce (ACT) and trained at specialized low-level conventional bombing missions, including the first ever use of Night Vision Goggles by B-52 crews. The specially trained crews were capable of delivering 6 strings of MK-117 munitions seconds apart with pinpoint accuracy operating from North Dakota. In six months of intensive training the special mission unit dropped more live ordnance in the Nevada and Utah test ranges than had been expended since the conclusion of the Vietnam War. The B-52 provided a powerful alternative or follow-on option, however, as the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent there was some risk to using the B-52 option against an SA-6 defended target.
Elements of the then-secret 4450th Tactical Group (USAF) were put on standby to fly the strike mission against Libya. Over 30 F-117 Nighthawk stealth attack aircraft had already been delivered to Tactical Air Command (USAF) and were operating from Tonopah Test Range Airport in Nevada. European Command senior officers knew nothing about the stealth capabilities of the F-117, or that the aircraft even existed. Within an hour of the planned launch of the F-117s, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger scrubbed the stealth mission, fearing a compromise of the secret aircraft and its development program. The air strike was carried out with conventional U.S. Navy and USAF aircraft. The F-117 would remain completely unknown to the world for several more months, before being unveiled in 1988 and featured prominently in media coverage of Operation Desert Storm.
For the Libyan raid, the United States was denied overflight rights by France, Spain, and Italy as well as the use of European continental bases, forcing the USAF portion of the operation to be flown around France and Spain, over Portugal and through the Straits of Gibraltar, adding 1,300 miles (2,100 km) each way and requiring multiple aerial refuelings. The French refusal alone added 2,800 km. French President François Mitterrand refused overflight clearance because the United States was interested in limited action in Libya while France was more interested in action that would remove Gaddafi from power. Another factor in the French decision was the United States’ last-minute failure to participate in a retaliatory air raid on Iranian positions after the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.
Targets
After several unproductive days of meetings with European and Arab nations, and influenced by an American serviceman’s death, on 14th April Ronald Reagan ordered an air raid on the following Libyan targets:
- Bab al-Azizia Barracks in Tripoli – Gaddafi’s command and control centre for overseas operations
- Murrat Sidi Bilal in Tripoli – a training camp for naval commandos and combat frogmen
- Mitiga International Airport – used by Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft
- Jamahiriyah Guard barracks in Benghazi – an alternative command and control headquarters for overseas operations, and which contained a warehouse for storage of MiG aircraft components
- Benina International Airport – used as a base by defending fighters
Ground crew prepares a 48th Tactical Fighter Wing F-111F aircraft for an air strike on Libya
Strike force
Among operational United States tactical aircraft, only the General Dynamics F-111 and the A-6 Intruder possessed the ability to attack at night with the required precision. Although the F-111s would be required to fly from distant bases, they were essential to mission success, because the eighteen A-6s available aboard USS Coral Sea (CV-43) and USS America (CV-66) could not carry enough bombs to simultaneously inflict the desired damage on the five targets selected.
An F-14A Tomcat that launched from USS America (CV-66) during Operation El Dorado Canyon
United States Air Force
Twenty-eight McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extenders and Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers took off from RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford shortly after 19:00 on 14th April. These tankers would conduct four silent refueling operations over the 6,000 mi (9,700 km) round-trip route the F-111s would fly to target. Within minutes the tankers were followed by twenty-four F-111F strike aircraft of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, flying from RAF Lakenheath and five EF-111A Ravens of the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing from RAF Upper Heyford. Six F-111s and one EF-111 were designated spares who returned to base after the first refueling was completed without any system failures among the designated strike aircraft. One F-111F had a flameout of one engine upon take off and was ordered back to base.
NATO E-3A AWACS aircraft flying out of Trapani air base in Italy provided airborne surveillance.
An A-7E from the USS America is armed with AGM-88 HARM ARMs and CBU-100 Rockeye cluster munitions, in preparation of Operation El Dorado Canyon
United States Navy
America was on station in the Gulf of Sidra, but Coral Sea was preparing to leave the Mediterranean, and made a high speed run from Naples through the Strait of Messina. America’s air group would strike targets in downtown Benghazi and provide fighter and suppression support for the USAF bombers, while Coral Sea’s planes would strike the Benina airfield outside Benghazi and provide fighter and suppression support for the Navy bombers. About 01:00 America launched six A-6E TRAM Intruder strike aircraft with Mark 82 bombs against the Jamahiriyah Guard barracks and six A-7 Corsair II strike support aircraft. Coral Sea, operating east of America simultaneously launched eight A-6E TRAM Intruders and six F/A-18A Hornets. Additional fighters were launched for combat air patrol (CAP).
The Raid
The raid began in the early hours of 15th April, with the stated objectives of sending a message and reducing Libya’s ability to support and train terrorists. Shortly after the raid Reagan warned “Today, we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again.”
Coordinated jamming by the EF-111s and EA-6B Prowlers began at 01:54 (Libyan time) as the A-7Es and F/A-18As began launching AGM-88 HARM and AGM-45 Shrike missiles for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The attack began at 0200 hours (Libyan time), and lasted about twelve minutes, with 60 tons of munitions dropped. The F-111 bombers’ rules of engagement required target identification by both radar and Pave Tack prior to bomb release to minimize collateral damage. Of the nine F-111s targeting Bab al-Azizia, only three placed their GBU-10 Paveway II bombs on target. One F-111 was shot down by a Libyan SAM over the Gulf of Sidra and one F-111’s bombs missed the barracks, striking diplomatic and civilian sites in Tripoli, and narrowly missing the French embassy. All three F-111s assigned to Sidi Bilal released their GBU-10 bombs on target. One of the six F-111s assigned to bomb the Tripoli airfield aborted its mission with a terrain-following radar malfunction, but the remaining five dropped BSU-49 high drag bombs destroying two Il-76 transport aircraft. America’s A-6s damaged the Jamahiriyah MiG assembly warehouse and destroyed four MiG shipping crates. Two A-6s from Coral Sea aborted their mission, but five A-6s with CBU-59 APAM cluster bombs and one with Mk 82 bombs struck Benina airfield destroying three or four MiGs, two Mil Mi-8 helicopters, one Fokker F27 Friendship transport, and one small straight-wing aircraft. A Boeing 727 was also reportedly destroyed during the Benina strike.
Ilyushin Il-76 targeted by the bombing
Some Libyan soldiers reportedly abandoned their positions in fright and confusion, while the officers were slow to give orders. Libyan anti-aircraft fire did not begin until after the planes had passed over their targets. No Libyan fighters launched, and HARM launches and jamming prevented any of the 2K12 Kub (SA-6), S-75 Dvina (SA-2), S-125 Neva/Pechora (SA-3), or Crotale SAM launches from homing. One SA-6 however was able to track onto an A-6 from VA-34 during the strike on the Jamahiriyah barracks but was evaded successfully.
Within twelve minutes, all United States aircraft were “feet wet” outbound over the Mediterranean. Navy strike aircraft had been recovered aboard their carriers by 02:53 (Libyan time) and surviving USAF planes, with the exception of one F-111, which landed in Naval Station Rota, Spain, with an overheated engine, had returned to Britain by 10:10 (Libyan time). Although the bombing operations were staged out of the UK, RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus was employed in the role of an alternate in case of emergency, and was used as such by at least one aircraft. This led to retaliatory action against the British base.
United States forces and targets
| Target | Planned | Actual | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | Bombing | Aircraft | Hit | Miss | ||
| Bab al-Azizia barracks | 9× F-111F | 36× GBU-10 2,000 lb (910 kg) LGB | 3× bombed 1× missed 4× aborts 1× lost |
13 | 3 | |
| Murat Sidi Bilal camp | 3× F-111F | 12× GBU-10 2,000 lb LGB | all bombed | 12 | – | |
| Tripoli airfield (fmr. Wheelus Air Base) |
6× F-111F | 72× Mk 82 500 lb (230 kg) RDB | 5× bombed 1× abort |
60 | – | |
| Jamahiriyah (Benghazi) barracks | 7× A-6E TRAM VA-34 | 84× Mk 82 500 lb RDB | 6× bombed 1× abort on deck |
70 | 2 | |
| Benina airfield | 8× A-6E TRAM VA-55 | 72× Mk 20 500 lb CBU 24× Mk 82 500 lb RDB |
6× bombed 2× aborts |
60× Mk 20 12× Mk 82 |
– | |
| Air defense networks |
Tripoli | 6× A-7E | 8× Shrike 16× HARM |
all aircraft fired | 8× Shrike 16× HARM |
|
| Benghazi | 24× F/A-18A VFA-131, VFA-132VMFA-314, VMFA-323 | 20× HARM | all aircraft fired | 20× HARM | ||
| Totals | 45 aircraft | 300 bombs 48 missiles |
35 bombed 1 missed 1 lost 8 aborts |
227 hits 5 misses 48 homing missiles |
||
| Support Aircraft | ||||||
| Air defense networks |
Tripoli | 5x EF-111A | ALQ-99 | 1× partial abort | – | – |
| 1x EA-6B VMAQ-2 | ALQ-99 | None | – | – | ||
| Benghazi | 3x EA-6B (2x VAQ-135/1x VMAQ-2) | ALQ-99 | None | – | – | |
| 3x EA-3B VQ-2 | EW/AAR | None | – | – | ||
| Early Warning | – | 2x E-2C VAW-123 | None | – | – | |
| 2x E-2C VAW-127 | None | – | – | |||
Libyan air defences
The Libyan air defense network was extensive, and included:
- 4 Long range S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon) anti-aircraft missile units with 24 launchers.
- 86 S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline) and S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa) anti-aircraft missile units with 276 launchers.Covering Tripoli alone were:
- 7 S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline) anti-aircraft missile units with 6 missiles launchers per unit giving 42 launchers.
- 12 S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa) anti-aircraft missile units with 4 missiles launchers per unit giving 48 launchers.
- 3 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) anti-aircraft missile units with 48 launchers.
- 1 9K33M2 Osa-AK (SA-8 Geko) anti-aircraft regiment with 16 launch vehicles.
- 2 Crotale II anti-aircraft units with 60 launch pads.
Casualties
Libyan
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and his family rushed out of their residence in the Bab al-Azizia compound moments before the bombs dropped, forewarned by a telephone call from Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, Malta’s Prime Minister. Bonnici had been made aware of the presence of the American strike force by Prime Minister Bettino Craxi of Italy; the latter nation had detected the then-unidentified aircraft off the West coast of Sicily and scrambled a flight of F-104 Starfighters to intercept it, discovering the strike force’s presence and being warned away by pilots with obvious American accents.
According to medical staff in a nearby hospital, two dozen casualties were brought in wearing military uniforms, and two without uniforms. Total Libyan casualties were estimated at 60, including those at the bombed airbases. An infant girl was among the casualties; her body was shown to American reporters, who were told she was Gaddafi’s recently adopted daughter Hana. However, there was and remains much skepticism over the claim. She may not have died; the adoption may have been posthumous; or he may have adopted a second daughter and given her the same name after the first one died.
American
Two U.S. Air Force captains—Fernando L. Ribas-Dominicci and Paul F. Lorence—were killed when their F-111 fighter-bomber (callsign Karma-52) was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra. In the hours following the attack, the U.S. military refused to speculate as to whether or not the fighter-bomber had been shot down, with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger suggesting that it could have experienced radio trouble or been diverted to another airfield. The next day, the Pentagon had announced it was no longer searching for the F-111 believed to be downed by a Libyan missile. On 25th December 1988, Gaddafi offered to release the body of Lorence to his family through Pope John Paul II. The body, returned in 1989, was identified as Ribas-Dominicci’s from dental records. An autopsy conducted in Spain confirmed that he had drowned after his plane was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra. Libya denies that it held Lorence’s body. However, Lorence’s brother said that he and his mother saw television footage of a Libyan holding a white helmet with the name “Lorence” stenciled on the back. Furthermore, William C. Chasey, who toured the Bab al-Azizia barracks, claimed to have seen two flight suits and helmets engraved with the names “Lorence” and “Ribas-Dominicci”, as well as the wreckage of their F-111. Gaddafi declared that the raid was a Libyan victory and stated that three American planes had been shot down, but Karma-52 was the only one that failed to return to base.
F-111F “Aardvark” 72-1448
Hobbymaster 1/72nd scale F-111F “Aardvark” 72-1448, 48th TFW CO, RAF Lakenheath August 1991 & F-15E “40 Years Eldorado Canyon” 91-311, 494 TFS, USAF RAF Lakenheath 2026
Check out the following Lakenheath 1/72nd scale models available to pre-order fromk Flying Tigers. Please be quick to order with both these models as they are sure to sell-out at pre-order stage.
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Thank you for reading this week’s Newsletter.
Richard
Flying Tigers.
